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Recent peacebuilding literature provides a sustained critique of externally designed conflict management processes and promotes instead local mechanisms. Such mechanisms, it is argued, will provide more ownership and agency to local actors and, thus, a more sustainable peace. But while there are many examples of local conflict management institutions, and many discussions of the hybrid outcomes of interaction between the global and local, the literature rarely explores exactly what transpires on the ground when international actors influence the operation of local peace processes. This paper provides exactly this insight. The data presented illustrates how local conflict management institutions in rural Sierra Leone are subtly manipulated by actors – both international and local – to maintain and enhance existing relations of power. The paper illustrates, therefore, the problems that arise when local conflict management institutions become interlaced with new forms of power and start themselves to serve as sites of contestation and resistance?
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While the initial decade of post-Cold War peace intervention was overly ambitious in its liberal exuberance, the decade since has been characterized by criticism of Western interventionism. Initial critical literature often recognized problems on the ground while endorsing intervention more generally (Paris, 2004), but later contributions questioned the very nature of intervention, the motivations of global powers (Chandler, 2006), and the illiberal effects of peacebuilding processes (Pugh, 2011). More recent contributions emphasize the unpredictable nature of intervention outcomes, and deploys concepts such as hybridity (Millar, 2014a; Peterson, 2012; Mac Ginty, 2011; Richmond, 2009) and friction (Björkdahl et al, 2016; Björkdahl and Höglund, 2013; Millar, van der Lijn, and Verkoren 2013) to understand the effects of peacebuilding where the global and the local interact. As such, they have pushed the field to focus increasingly on local individuals and communities in the context of post-conflict peacebuilding and they are part of what Mac Ginty and Richmond have called the ‘local turn’ (2013). 
No surprisingly, there have also been heavy critiques of this local turn. It is argued that the local is often unequal and contested and that those promoting local mechanisms are promoting illiberal systems (Paris, 2010). Others argue that the local turn accepts an inappropriate dichotomy between global and local and is, therefore, recreating the binaries it claims to deconstruct (Paffenholz 2015). It has even been argued that the local turn may serve to disempower local actors by encouraging international actors to intervene directly in local social contexts (Chandler, 2013). Although this paper will address all three of these critiques, the last one is the starting point for my analysis as it should indeed concern local turn advocates if a focus on local actors and institutions serves to encourage intervention at the local level. However, while this critique seems plausible, there is little analysis of such local appropriation on the ground. This article starts to fill that gap by closely examining the interaction between interventionary actors and Local Conflict Management Institutions (LCMIs) on the ground in Sierra Leone. 
The remainder of this article is divided into four parts. Part one provides a short review of the ‘local turn’ literature; focusing on the critique of interventionism, my definition of LCMIs, and the counter-critiques of the local turn. Part two includes very brief descriptions of the conflict and post-conflict situation in Sierra Leone, the LCMIs in that context, and the international intervention that is interacting with those institutions on the ground. Through a number of empirical examples, part three illustrates the manner in which LCMIs are manipulated in subtle ways to serve the purposes of established power. What is perhaps most interesting, however, is that this established power may be either global or local. The final section discusses three core implications of my findings for the ‘local turn’ in both theory and practice and directly addresses the three critiques noted above.

Peacebuilding: global and local
While contemporary conflicts are diverse and complex, peace interventions have unfortunately become packages of technocratic, problem-solving, or tool-kit solutions applied by professionals across very diverse cases with little consideration for local political, economic, cultural, or social distinctions (Mac Ginty, 2012; Pugh, 2011; De Waal, 2009, Autesserre, 2014; Kritz, 2009; Sending, 2009). Abundant research has now shown the limitations of such an approach, illustrating both the lack of local ownership (Richmond and Mac Ginty, 2013; Thiedon, 2013; Millar, 2010, 2013; Richmond, 2012; Donais, 2012, 2009; Shaw, Waldorf and Hazan, 2010; Sending, 2009; Franks and Richmond, 2008; Shaw, 2005) and the significant gaps between what the international community believes it is doing in such cases and what local people experience as a result of intervention (Robins, 2011; Millar, 2011a, b, 2012a, b, 2015a; Autesserre, 2010; Isaacs, 2009). As a result, many now argue against the application of ‘cookie-cutter’ solutions (Call and Cousens, 2008: 14) and for more sensitivity and adjustment to local context. A central aspect of this proposed approach is the reliance on or utilization of LCMIs (Pogodda and Richmond, 2015: 899).
This article defines LCMIs as indigenous or pre-existing institutions of conflict management or resolution based on concepts and practices salient within a bounded geographical or cultural space. Such mechanisms are not everywhere the same, nor are they all salient within what might initially match our idea of ‘the local’. Some LCMIs are rooted in concepts shared across regions over which a specific culture dominates, such as the mediating role played by community elders throughout West Africa or the role of contracts and judicial processes throughout Europe and its colonial offspring. Such LCMIs are not bounded by a local geography, but are culturally specific. Other LCMIs may not be shared throughout an entire culture, but are rooted instead in the force of single institutions or personalities. We might think of the influence of respected Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) such as Conciliation Resources or Search for Common Ground within specific post-conflict contexts (see examples in van Tongeren et al., 2005), or individual actors such as Desmond Tutu and Nelson Mandela in multi-cultural post-Apartheid South Africa. 
Various scholars have previously turned towards the local for the purpose of building peace (Cochrane, 2000; Lederach, 1997; Shonholze, 1984) and many have described LCMIs across different cultures (Mac Ginty, 2011; Shaw, 2010; Quinn, 2009; van Tongeren et al., 2005; Al-Krenawi & Graham, 1999; Podolefsky, 1990; Hamer, 1980; Eckett and Newmark, 1980; Dillon, 1976). While the recent local turn is not entirely new, however, it is somewhat unique in its potential to extend outside academic theory and influence the policy and practice of international peacebuilding. Quite distinct from anthropologists, sociologists and social-psychologists who have studied LCMIs, International Relations scholars working in this area have both a keen interest in influencing policy and the connections within policy and practitioner communities that are necessary to promote change. However, and partially as a response to the growing influence of this literature, many have also critiqued the ‘local turn’.
Some describe the local turn as romanticizing the local and as failing to hold to ‘universal’ liberal principles. If we do not incorporate proven universal principles of democracy, market economics, and human rights into local contexts, relying instead on non-liberal norms dominant within those contexts, we will reproduce the structures of marginalization and inequality that led to conflict in the first place. Only the universal values inherent in the liberal model, it is claimed, can provide the foundation for sustainable peace (Doyle, 2005; Paris, 2004). Others argue that the local turn inappropriately constructs the global and local as ‘binary opposites,’ and is therefore blind to diversity within the local and the international, ignores the prevalence of local elites within peacebuilding processes, and generally oversimplifies the operation of power and resistance within post-conflict contexts (Paffenholz 2015: 858). Further, while those who advocate for a local turn argue that it will decrease marginalization and empower local communities, Chandler argues that the non-linear interpretation of peacebuilding effects foundational to the local turn, which highlights the ineffectuality of top-down intervention, in fact opens the door for global actors to target ‘society directly’ (2013: 22). If we can’t predictably implement top-down solutions, that is, we must target our interventions at the social as opposed to the institutional level; thus applying power directly to local society. 
The literature, therefore, largely depicts two competing narratives; one that promotes local institutions and another which describes their negative implications for sustainable peace or the potential for the local to be colonised by global power (see Richmond and Mac Ginty 2015). More recently, however, the concept of friction has been deployed to provide a means to analyse the unpredictable and emergent nature of the interactions between agents at different locations on the international/local spectrum (Björkdahl et al., 2016; Björkdahl and Höglund, 2013; Millar, van der Lijn and Verkoren, 2013) and indicative efforts have been made to grapple with the diversity and complexity of ‘the local’ (Richmond and Pogodda, 2016; Randazzo, 2016; Lee and Özerdem, 2015; Paffenhlz, 2015; Mac Ginty, 2015; Kappler, 2015; Hyden, 2015). In her recent reflections on the issue, for example, Schierenbeck notes the importance of ‘questioning the local/global binary’ and the simplifications it entails (ibid: 1028), and of recognizing ‘the agency of local actors’ and their own ability to make strategic decisions and take positions (2015: 1027). But even in these more recent contributions, empirical analyses of interactions between the various peacebuilding actors in the functioning of LCMIs are absent. Examining this issue will allow us to test the veracity of claims regarding and the potential implications of the direct intervention of power into local contexts. Before presenting the data, however, I will briefly describe the situation in post-conflict Sierra Leone, the FDI project here investigated, and the LCMIs analyzed. 

War, peace, and conflict management in rural Sierra Leone
The conflict in Sierra Leone (1991-2002) is regularly discussed as driven largely by economic as opposed to purely ideological factors (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008: 439; Ballentine and Sherman, 2003: 10). These include domestic problems such as poverty, deprivation, and the marginalization of youth in the decades prior to the war (Shaw, 2010: 111; Peters and Richards, 1998; Abdullah, 1998), as well as the position of Sierra Leone within broader regional and global economic structures which in many ways drove these youth’s experiences (Reno 1997; Richards 1996: xvii). While economic dynamics helped drive the war, however, the ensuing violence only exacerbated these issues which have ‘continued unabated since the war ended in 2002’ (Shaw, 2010: 111). It is for these reasons that the post-war governments have prioritized economic development to provide jobs and counter the ongoing threat of violence from marginalized youth (Keili, 2009). 
Similar to other cases such as Rwanda (Hasselskog and Schierenbeck, 2015), as economic problems were a cause of the past violence, the current leadership sees socio-economic development as central to sustainable peace. This is entirely in line with the marketization pillar of the liberal peacebuilding model (Leonardsson and Rudd, 2015: 826; Doyle 2005), which considers liberal marketization as equal to political and judicial reform in post-conflict contexts and positions foreign investors as influential post-conflict actors (Hughes, Öjendal and Schierenbeck, 2015: 819; Millar, 2015c, 2016b). Indeed, the government of Sierra Leone has worked hard to attract foreign investors, diversify exports, create jobs, and increase the state’s tax revenues; implementing the liberal free-market model preferred by global institutions as the path to sustainable peace and the incorporation of local actors into a form of ‘market citizenship’ (Hughes, 2015: 912). The Bio-energy project described here is one product of these efforts and is in many ways the embodiment of the marketization pillar of the liberal peace. 
Having initially arrived in the country in 2009, by 2013 the company had leased 40,000 hectares of land and was cultivating approximately 10,000 hectares of sugar cane for export to Europe as ethanol. As only 25% of the lease area was placed under cultivation, the company constructed the project in and around existing villages. As a result, no households were physically relocated and the company was responsible for communicating and coordinating with scores of villages, hundreds of land-owning families, and 25,000 to 30,000 individuals who lived within this large area.  The LCMIs utilized for this communication and coordination are the subjects of this paper. Specifically, we are talking here of the customary authorities in rural Sierra Leone. 
In Sierra Leone conflict management, whether at family, village, or chiefdom level, is the role of the customary elders and Chiefs. The vast majority of conflicts are taken not to formal courts or institutions of central government, but to the elders and Chiefs for resolution (Denney, 2013: 11). As such, the Chiefs are the ultimate authorities within chiefdoms that can cover hundreds of villages and tens of thousands of hectares. Small conflicts within or between families that cannot be solved at lower levels (by village head-men or section Chiefs) are brought to higher authorities for mediation, and in the area of land conflicts the Paramount Chiefs make and enforce all final decisions. These Chiefs hold the memory of what family farms what land, how long they have farmed that particular plot, and the details of any land exchanges. In short, as no formal system of land titling was in effect prior to the war in rural areas, the Chiefs served as the repository of all land agreements and the final arbiter in land conflicts. 
However, chiefly authority is closely connected to the patron-client system dominant in Sierra Leone, in which reciprocal relationships exist between the Big Men and their clients and consumption by a big-man, is ‘balanced by generosity and other benevolent forms of extension to their dependents and supporters’ (Shaw, 2002: 256). This authority is, therefore, inextricably related to the power they wield over resources, which has historically meant land (Jackson, 2007: 100; Peters and Richards, 2011: 392). These LCMIs hold power, therefore, based on deeply engrained conceptions of authority, and remain today the primary mediators of conflict in rural Sierra Leone, but if it is only the control over and regular distribution of wealth and resources that give the Chief his influence and the authority to mediate conflict. What happens, therefore, when this customary system becomes pervaded with the power and resources of an interventionary actor? 
In order to answer this question I will present various examples observed during seven months of fieldwork in 2012 and 2013 which followed an ethnographic approach to evaluating local experiences of international interventions (for methodological details see Millar, 2014b). The dynamics I will discuss illustrate clearly how the arrival of the company has altered the function of the Chiefs in their role as LCMIs. The substantial resources the company can bring to bear have served to incentivized these actors to turn the LCMIs from primarily conflict management mechanism into primarily communication instruments dominated by the companies chosen narrative. What I will show below, therefore, is that chiefly power has not been stripped or destroyed, but has been subtly redirected, and the LCMIs in this case are today functioning to manage or control non-elite local agency and resistance. The LCMIs now serve not primarily to manage local conflicts, but more and more to contain dissent through subtle manipulation of the local population. 

Local conflict management repurposed: Paramount Chiefs as biased mediators
As noted above, the LCMIs in this case are built on the traditional authority of the Paramount Chiefs. However, as I will describe, new resources introduced into the local context by the FDI project influence greatly the application and effect of these LCMIs. As the project is spread over three different chiefdoms it is having significant effects on the LCMIs within each and the nature of these effects became quite clear during my fieldwork. In this section I will describe a number of interrelated ways that this occurs, primarily by morphing the role of the Paramount Chief into that of a biased mediator between the communities within the land-lease area on the one hand, and the company itself on the other. It is important to note, however, that if space permitted many more examples could be described. 
As the custodian of the land and the central mediator between parties in conflict, the Paramount Chiefs are involved in all significant land disputes within the land-lease area of the FDI project. As described, this is the customary role of the Chief. While this role has been retained, with the arrival of the company it has also been transformed. It has been retained in that the Paramount Chiefs remain the most respected figure among individuals and communities in the local setting, but transformed in that there is a new and overwhelmingly powerful actor with whom mediation must occur. These dynamics have resulted in what I can only describe as biased mediation on the part of the Paramount Chiefs, who are incentivized now not to represent the local communities, nor even to be a neutral party between the communities and the company, but to ensure for the company a compliant population. 
I first became aware of this dynamic the first time I attended a meeting where the company executives interacted directly with the local communities. This was a meeting in late April 2012 at which the company was scheduled to pay land-lease payments to 21 communities for which three male elders from each of the communities would receive payment in exchange for signing – or thumb printing – an agreement stating that they accept the arrangement with the company. The meeting was held in a community hall in a large village, with a handful of representatives from each of the 21 villages attending and with on-lookers from the host village encircling the hall. The meeting was also attended by senior staff of the company’s Social and Economic Outreach Unit, the legal representatives of the villagers (paid by the company), a local representative of parliament, the District Officer, and the Paramount Chief. 
The meeting itself resembled any community meeting in rural Sierra Leone, where the elders and senior men talk at length and the audience responds to some speeches positively, others angrily, and others not at all; these meetings can be so long that audience members often fall asleep in their chairs. However, what was most interesting to me was the manner in which every single one of the senior men (for a discussion of the gendered dynamics of the project see Millar 2015b), including the Paramount Chief, used their allotted time to directly praise the project and to instruct the audience on how to deal with any grievances against the company; i.e. to complain not to the company, but to the Chiefs. The comments from each of the senior men, including those of the Paramount Chief, all incorporated direct warnings against any disruption of the company’s operations. They argued repeatedly that any disruption of the company’s operations will be met with police action and community members will be arrested. Indeed, before the meeting there was a disagreement between two families regarding land ownership and the company quickly brought the Police Commander in to instruct the audience on the law and the maintenance of order.
This message was repeated over and over again at the various meetings I attended during my fieldwork. At another payment meeting in a different chiefdom in late May another of the Paramount Chiefs praised the company and similarly warned the community against causing problems for the company. At this meeting the Chief was the first to speak and talked about individuals he knew who were now working for the company and described the company as a partner for the communities. These positive statements about the company were used as a preamble to broader instructions to the community regarding the appropriate responses to the company. The company’s project will be good for the people, he argued, but only if the communities let the company operate; they must not disrupt the company’s work. I interviewed this particular Paramount Chief a few months later, in early September of 2012 and he restated the same message; that the company has followed the laws of Sierra Leone, is having and will continue to have positive impacts, and should be protected from local people who may take the law into their own hands when they have a grievance. The central point for him, as for the other Chiefs, was to avoid disruption.
This message was perhaps most forcefully voiced by the third Paramount Chief at a meeting at the start of August where a national NGO was launching its annual report regarding the company’s work and impact. Unlike the previous two meetings, here the audience was not primarily villagers, but CSO representatives and journalists. As a result, the audience participated far more vocally and inspired the few villagers in attendance to voice much more negative feelings than were usually described at community meetings; where community members are largely passive recipients of elite’s messages. This, in turn, drew a more aggressive stance from the Paramount Chief in attendance. One man from a village spoke up from the audience, for example, and described how he had reported his grievance to the Chief but nothing was done about the problem he was facing; nothing had been fixed. The Chief responded that that could never happen. He argued that when a complaint comes to the Chief he must respond, because it is his responsibility, so if any complaint was made it must have been responded to and if nothing had been fixed, then the complaint must simply have been wrong. This is the kind of logic that passes unquestioned by villages in rural Sierra Leone who deeply respect the authority of the Chiefs, but quite simply means that a complaint is not real unless the Chief decides so. 
This kind of response is symptomatic of the underlying problem. The LCMIs, as described by the second Paramount Chief discussed above, situate the Chief as the correct interface between the people and the company; in his usual conflict mediator role. However, each of the three Chief’s has interpreted this to mean that they must ‘cool the situation’ and convince people to ‘hold your hearts’; or to calm themselves and not take the situation into their own hands. The Chiefs recognize, therefore, that the people are quite angry with the company, but they do not see their role as to deal with this anger in a proactive way or to address the problems local people face. Quite to the contrary, they have interpreted their role as to insulate the company from this anger and make sure that the company does not experience any disruptions. This is clear in the case above, where the Chief refused to acknowledge that villagers could have complaints that would be ignored by the Chiefs.
This was also clear in another case in a small village I visited in the middle of June 2012. This village was part of my original random sample of 10 villages from within the land-lease area and, as such, I set out to make a first visit early one morning. After arriving at the village and waiting for about 15 minutes as a young boy ran out to the fields to find the village headman, I found that there was quite a bit of tension between the headman and the various young men who accompanied him back from the fields. This village had not yet signed the land-lease agreement and, as such, had refused the company the right to take soil samples from their land. However, as described by the headman, the company had carried on anyway, both taking soil samples and then also clearing trees from a large piece of land and excavating a large pit from which they took earth and sand later used for the construction of a wide dirt road that passed not far from the village. The headman and the young men of the village considered this a breach of their rights, as they had never agreed to allow the company to use their land or been paid any money (for further information regarding the leases and contracts see Millar, 2016a). 
But, the headman argued, he could not talk to me about this as the Chief had just recently come to tell him to ‘bear up’ and not complain. The piece of land that had been destroyed by the company (very visible on the road and covering perhaps 10 acres) was valuable to the village and the young men were clearly very angry and desperate to tell me their story – perhaps thinking that I would carry their grievance to some party that would resolve the issue. But the headman was adamant that the Chief had told them not to push their case, or as they say in Sierra Leone, not to grumble about the situation. I found this case to be quite shocking because the headman was clearly fearful of the Paramount Chief. In the short time we were speaking to him that morning he repeated multiple times that the company had destroyed the land and done so without permission, but at the same time he stated repeatedly that he could not go against the Paramount Chief and voice his grievances. As with the above examples, the Chief was serving to insulate the company from complaints; continuing his role as mediator between parties to conflict, but in a biased way.
While this dynamic was becoming more and more clear during my fieldwork in 2012, it was not until 2013 that this seemed to hit home for local communities and boil over into anger not only at the company but at the Chiefs themselves. Between my leaving the area in September 2012 and returning in November 2013, there were a number of protests and strikes against the company, a handful of violent incidents, and a move on the part of a number of villages (35 land owning families in total) to sue the Chiefs for misrepresenting their interests – with the help of a US legal aid organization. Upon returning to the same villages to conduct a second round of interviews in 2013 it was clear that local people – even those respectful of the Chiefs – had started to question their role as representatives of the people. 
An old man in one of the villages with the longest experience of the project provides the best example of this shift. During my visit in 2012 this man had been very respectful of the Paramount Chief, but during my second round of fieldwork he told me a very different story. When I asked him about the recent protests and the position of the Chief’s vis-a-vis the company, he told me that, just as the community has its society’s (the secret societies for both men and women), so the company has a society, and anyone who is outspoken or who may have power in the community: 
‘they will just bring you close to them, so that you will leave them and stop disturbing them. They will just continue and go far with bad things. They will not even think to do good things. That is their society.’ 
What this village elder was arguing is that the Chiefs – and other influential people – are being indoctrinated as members of the company’s society so that they will no longer work on behalf of the people but will work on behalf of the company. This perspective directly echoes my own interpretation of Chiefs as newly biased mediators, although placing these dynamics within locally resonant schemas.
This was also made evident in the position the Paramount Chief’s took regarding the CSOs who were stepping in to represent the local communities. While in 2012 I had been told of verbal attacks on CSOs by funders of the project – a member of the Dutch Entrepreneurial Development Bank (FMO), for example, told an audience that CSOs should be ignored and would only work against their interests – in 2013 I was repeatedly told that the Chiefs themselves were attacking civil society for ‘inciting’ communities. Staff of national CSOs involved in land-rights initiatives throughout the country told me that they were coming under constant attack for ‘provoking’ and ‘inciting’ local populations, which is, of course, the exact opposite of the Chief’s attempt to convince communities to ‘bear up’ and thus to contain local anger and limit disruption. The CSOs were, quite problematically for the Chiefs, making the local populations less acquiescent, less manageable.

Discussion 
These various examples illustrate three important points central to the local turn literature. First – and echoing recent discussions of local agency (Schierenbeck, 2015; Kappler, 2015) – the examples provided here evidence not a simple manipulation of ‘the local’ by ‘the international’, but a dynamic and unpredictable interplay between conscious agents making their own decisions in a complex transitional environment. While these various agents are being incentivized by the substantial resources the bio-energy company can bring to the table, the decisions they are making are serving their own tactical purposes and strategic goals, while also servicing of the company’s needs. It is easiest to see this in the case of the three Paramount Chiefs who, while certainly serving as biased mediators on behalf of the company’s interests, are also negotiating this new landscape in their own interests. 
As a result of the FDI project, for example, each of the Chiefs receives substantial payments in the form of ‘transport costs’ for their attendance at community meetings; at about $90 per meeting this is more than the average local employee receives for a full month’s labour (approximately $75-85). In addition, as male heads of land-owning families, each also controls the land-lease payments distributed to their family (valued at $3.20 per acre), and in their customary role they each control one of the three chiefdom councils, which receive $0.72 for every acre leased – or approximately $71,000 in total annually – which is then distributed to clients, thus ensuring chiefly influence. As such, this new influx of resources incentivizes each Chief to modify their usual LCMI role to avoid any disruption to these benefits. Thus they are incentivized to manage local non-elite populations and ensure their acquiescence. This serves both of the company and Chief’s own economic and political interests. This case, therefore, clearly supports the need to take seriously local agency and local actor’s strategic and tactical decisions in transitional environments.
Second, the examples provided here describe a far more nuanced and diverse ‘local’ than is often considered. Echoing the many concerns regarding the construction of a simplistic binary between international and local, this data clearly describes competition and contestation within the local, whether competition at the local elite level (between CSOs and Chiefs) or competition between local elites and non-elites (between Chiefs and local communities). In fact even this is overly simplistic, as within the non-elite local level too individuals and communities often disagreed regarding the Chiefs’ actions. In this case, and particularly on my return visit in 2013, some non-elite locals still believed the Chiefs would protect their interests while others clearly disagreed and, as described, 35 families were even attempting to bring a law suit against the Chiefs. This case makes it quite clear, therefore, that we cannot assume a unitary ‘local’. This is true also of the international, of course, as both the bio-energy company paying the Chiefs and the US based legal aid organization assisting in their suit are international actors. The international too is diverse.
However, recognizing that there is no unitary ‘local’ and no unitary ‘international’ does not imply that there is no analytic utility to this conceptual binary. Diversity within the local or the international does not negate the utility of either ‘local’ or ‘international’ as categories of analysis. Any categorization is made in reference to the choice of variable by which to define it. If we decide that opinions regarding a UN project or a government policy will define the categories, then indeed there will never be a local and an international as opinions regarding projects and policies will always be diverse within both. However, if we define local and international based on characteristics such as the extent of access to global travel, to foreign education, and to international financial markets, then some actors will clearly be ‘more local’ and others will be ‘more international’. 
Based on these variables citizens of developed states, educated at elite universities, working for the UN, and implementing peacebuilding projects are international, while semi-literate residents of rural villages working as subsistence farmers in northern Sierra Leone are local. There are, of course, many grey areas and irregularities – local elites who grew up in rural villages but were lucky enough to gain some educational opportunities, for example – but the existence of variability within sections of this international/local spectrum does not negate the analytical utility of that spectrum. Even Paffenholz, in her critique of the common resort to this binary by local turn authors (2015), falls back on that binary in her recognition of the dominance of ‘local elites’ within peacebuilding interventions. This is not a critique of Paffenholz for failing to escape the binary, but recognition of its continuing analytical utility even while we acknowledge and accept the absence of unity within any particular section of the spectrum.  
This is particularly important because of the third key point illustrated by the data presented above; the manner in which power travels or diffuses along this spectrum. Power is a fluid construct located in and transmitted through the relationships between diverse actors. It can be conceived of as cultural, social, religious, political, military, and in many ways besides. Indeed, Kappler recently reconceived local identification itself as an element of power operating between actors in peacebuilding contexts (2015). But viewing both local and international actors as conscious agents, while also recognizing the diversity among actors at any point along this spectrum, demands also that we also recognize how cultural, social, economic, and political capital is controlled and deployed along this spectrum, in particular directions, and with particular effects. 
It should be clear that in the case examined here economic capital was deployed in a distinctive manner leading to agents on the ground making specific and strategic decisions with particular ends in mind and from which particular results emerged. As evidenced above, the Chiefs were strongly incentivized to perform their customary mediating role, but they redefined that role as to cajole and convince the local people to ‘bear up’ and avoid disturbing the project. This maintained the Chief’s own benefits and privileged positions. As such, the LCMIs no longer served to solve conflict and promote a sustainable peace. They instead functioned to manage local populations. This, we must recognize, is a function of power of various kinds as it traverses the spectrum from international to local. In turn, this application of power led eventually to active resistance among many workers and villages. The economic capital – one form of power – deployed by the company, functioned eventually to incentivize local actions of resistance such as work stoppages, protests, crop arson, and lawsuits – alternative forms of power. These effects were not intended, but emerged nonetheless. Quite at odds with Pogodda and Richmond’s recent finding that LCMIs in Palestine ‘maintain their distance from day-to-day politics and thus remain beyond the grasp of political elites’ (2015: 899), in Sierra Leone the LCMIs were very much subject to, as well as arenas for, the interplay of different forms of power. 
	
Conclusion
I believe this paper has illustrated that LCMIs are neither the guardians of local ownership and agency, nor easily or predictably manipulated by external actors. My data speaks directly to the critique of the local turn literature as resorting always to a simplified international/local binary that ignores diversity and undermines local agency but also defends the use of this binary. In my opinion in fact, this is something of a hollow critique. While we must recognize the diversity located among actors at any particular point on the spectrum, we also must maintain this conceptual binary and a spectrum running from international to local as an analytical tool if we want to analyse, understand, and address the application of power in peacebuilding processes. 
Further, the data has clearly shown that while the FDI project had the ability to intervene directly in the functioning of the LCMIs in this case, this did not provide it with any more predictable interventionary power than with top-down approaches. The local agents of conflict management did act to insulate the company from the grievances of the communities in the short term – out of self-interest and as a result of their own strategic agency – but in the longer term this nourished experiences of marginalization and undermined sustainable peace. There is, therefore, ample evidence that these actions have not resulted in stability and profitability that will maintain over the long-term, but have instead served to blind the company and the Chiefs to the conflict promoting effects of their own behaviour (for more on the conflict promoting influences of the project see Millar, 2016b). In other words, the direct intervention into local society so feared by Chandler failed to establish a secure environment for socio-economic development – which we must recognize as a central cornerstone of the broader peacebuilding project (Richmond and Pagodda, 2016: 3-4) – but instead resulted in a similar form of friction and unpredictability already identified so prominently with top-down institutional interventions (Björkdahl et al., 2016). 
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